I have posted about PodShow’s funding upon the news “leaking”, and nothing I have read, heard or watched since seems to contradict what I sort of guessed: Kleiner Perkins led the round, and invited Sequoia and Ram Shiram in – most likely so that PodShow founders end up a Google feel-alike funding syndicate. No idea of the actual split of the capital among syndicate players, but that is really not important – at least for now. Update: just found the press release announcing the investment.
The questions I got after my initial post ranged from “What is the business model ?” to “What are these VCs seeing in podcasting ?” (including some “WTF ???”). And since I repeated my (modest) explanation a number of times, it was natural to post it.
The prestige of the syndicate, which was subject to mockery when they invested $25M in Google way back when – and returned a “mere” 300+ times that investment, has obviously increased the credibility of PodShow – almost instantly. But the business model is yet to be validated, and the real size of the opportunity to be assessed.
To get a glimpse of PodShow’s vision, I would recommend listening to the Aug 15th issue of the Gillmor Gang during which CEO Ron Bloom (26’ into the show) clarifies the current master plan: essentially tap into the $27B budget today allocated to broadcast radio – and get a portion of it shifted to a medium that will eventually allow marketers to have a fine grain targetting and better tracking (I bet our MP3 players are soon going to provide many more data than today as to what you listen to, skip, come back to, etc. – all constitute elements of Attention metadata). Bloom in the same program explains that he and Curry are essentially doing the same thing they successfully accomplished a number of years ago with their previous company: convince an existing establishment that a new medium in being created, and that – like every new medium – very large opportunities are being created. Good complements to this program are Dan Farber’s account of the Gang’s discussion, and this video interview of Ron Bloom and Adam Curry by MarketWatch’s Bambi Francisco.
Looking at it from the standpoint of the VCs now, what do we have: a very large market ($27B in ad spending) that has a chance of being disrupted, a couple of guys who have worked together before, and have succeeded in participating to the disruption of an adjacent space, and one of the two guys is one of the most visible – if not the most visible – opinion leader in this new space. Very large market being ripe for disruption, market changing play, repeat team, recognized leader (providing a de-facto differentiation), not too crazy probability of success,… all these factors tend to look very positive in a VC investment context.
What else ? Risky investment ? What is the exit ? Answers to these two questions can be found in two interviews. On investment risk, I will quote DFJ’s John Fisher from this terrific interview by Sterling Hoffman:
In general, there’s a critical notion that many people don’t understand about early stage or high-risk investing. That is, the most that you can possibly lose on any given investment is one times your money. The most you can make is unlimited. The truth is that risk and reward are often directly correlated. It doesn’t make any sense to be afraid of risk as a venture capitalist. What you need to be concerned about is: “How big is the upside?” The truth is that in the early stage of the venture capital business it is common to lose all of your money on the first third of your deals. It’s common to make no meaningful return on the second-third of your deals and it’s common to make all of your return on the last third. The baseball metaphor really applies: if you’re a .333 hitter, you’re at the top of the league. In the venture capital business, if you make money on a third of your deals; you should be doing fine so long as you’re making more than three times your money on average on all your deals, you’re making money for your limited partners across the board. A home run analogy really applies too. The magnitude of your winners determines the ultimate degree of success. So the home run deals make the difference between mediocre returns and superb returns. What really matters is the magnitude of the winners. You’ve got to swing for the fences every time you place a bet because, given the fact that the risk is high in all of these situations, you better make sure that the winners really pay off. So you will have to be very ambitious for them and only invest in companies that can, if they become successful and truly achieve their vision, become extraordinarily valuable.
On exits, I will refer to a podcast interview PodTech.net’s John Furrier did with Sequoia’s Mark Kvamme. At some point, John asks the same question I asked Mark at Vertical Leap (on the VC panel I was moderating): how do you plan exits ? Mark provided a consistent answer: “Our job (at Sequoia) is to build great companies, exits take care of themselves”.
My position is therefore that it made a ton of sense for KP and Sequoia to come in, and fund PodShow given its potential and its risk profile. They are amongst a handful of firms that would be able to support the development of this opportunity into a new market, without looking constantly at the huge execution and adoption risk that the team will be facing. Because at the end of the day, the worst that can happen is that they lose their $9M (or whatever they will have invested) – and all things considered (in this context), they certainly won’t lose sleep over it given the potential payout.
Recent Comments